Showing posts with label Rules and Bylaws Committee. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rules and Bylaws Committee. Show all posts

Sunday, April 30, 2023

Sunday Series: Have the Democrats Actually Created Calendar Chaos for 2024 and Beyond?

There have been a number of stories written over the last several months about the calendar rules changes the Democratic National Committee adopted at its winter meeting in Philadelphia back in February. And a number of them find the space to add a footnote about 2028. That, and this is a paraphrase, if Biden runs against only token opposition, then the calendar changes may not mean a whole lot in 2024 and may not last beyond then.

With President Biden officially announcing his reelection bid this past week, stories of that ilk have forced their way back onto the printed page, virtual or otherwise. That includes the narrow genre of "forfeiting New Hampshire" stories but also some broader overviews of the calendar changes that lean heavily on the uncertainty -- if not CHAOS! -- created by the DNC changes.1 Ben Jacobs had one such piece up at Vox in the wake of the president's announcement. 

First of all, let's clear the air. 2028 is a long way off. Much will happen between now and then. The events that occur will affect the next things that happen and so on. Yes, even all the way to 2028. It goes without saying, then, that this 2024 calendar trial run will have some impact on the rules that are ultimately adopted by the DNC for the 2028 cycle. But just how much impact?

After all, that is what 2024 is for Democrats: a trial run. It is a trial run that seems likely to occur under less than competitive conditions and offer little in the way of lessons that can be carried over into subsequent cycles. From a purely academic standpoint, the DNC is not going to learn much from moving South Carolina to the first position for 2024. Rules makers in the party will not be able to step back and say, for example, that the South Carolina primary was any more or less determinative in identifying a nominee in 2024 than it has been in the past. Now, that is not to say that there is not meaningful symbolism in the change at the top of the calendar, but rather, that the learning opportunities for the national party from the Iowa-for-South-Carolina swap in 2024 -- with the 2028 rules in mind -- are likely to be limited. 

But again, 2024 is a trial run and one that is unlikely to be completely devoid of learning opportunities for the national party. It is just that those chances will not come from how effective South Carolina was as a lead-off contest, or for that matter, what Michigan's primary would mean at the end of the pre-window period. Instead, the most learning will come from what has and is seemingly likely to dominate the stories of the Democratic nomination process at the outset in 2024: New Hampshire (and maybe Iowa) versus the DNC.


Penalties
Any lesson gleaned from the 2024 process, then, is much more likely to come from the penalties side than anywhere else. And the early signals are that those penalties -- and the DNC -- will get a fairly stern test from New Hampshire if not Iowa. Democrats from the Hawkeye and Granite states have been quick since the winter meeting vote (but also since the December DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee (DNCRBC) adoption of the changes) to cite state laws that tie their hands with respect to (timing) compliance with the new calendar. And that foreshadows some lengthy brinkmanship in the weeks and months ahead.

Of course, there will be exit ramps along the way. The DNC adoption of the calendar rules, however, probably forestalls any retreat by the national party in the near term. But Iowa and New Hampshire Democrats will have to submit draft delegate selection plans (DSPs) to the DNCRBC in spring 2023. Democrats in the Granite state already have ahead of the May 3 deadline this coming week. However, ultimately the state parties will have to have those DSPs approved (or rejected) by the DNCRBC in the summer or early fall. If one or both of the state parties formally defy the rules in those draft DSPs or leave the contest date blank in them -- the latter is the route New Hampshire Democrats have chosen -- then that likely entrenches both sides even further. It is soon after that point that the DNCRBC is likely to not only apply the delegate penalties -- an automatic 50 percent reduction -- but to up them to a full 100 percent reduction of the delegation.

The temptation then is to fast forward to January 2024 when New Hampshire (and maybe Iowa) potentially hold rogue contests despite those national party penalties. However, that would miss a key component of the rules changes for this cycle: candidate penalties or rather, the result of potential candidate penalties. The president has thrown his hat in the ring for the Democratic nomination, and his team has already signaled that he intends to abide by the rules the party Biden leads adopted for the 2024 process. Part of those rules include a prohibition on candidates campaigning in states with rogue primaries and caucuses. And part of the new and broader definition of "campaigning" for 2024 is filing to appear on the ballot in a rogue state. 

Iowa and New Hampshire have already acquired one asterisk in the Democratic presidential nomination process because neither is as diverse as the national Democratic electorate. But Biden not being on the ballot would add another asterisk to any results in 2024 and subsequently hover over consideration of the traditionally early pair as possible early calendar states in future cycles. 

And while that may be, the counter to all of that has always been that Iowa and New Hampshire do not really have that many delegates anyway. Wins in either, it has often been said, are more about the wins themselves and resulting momentum they generate than they are about the delegates accrued. True, but the flip side of that -- the rejoinder to the not that many delegates response -- is that Iowa and New Hampshire do not have that many delegates

What the DNC has really done for 2024 is create uncertainty for future cycles. Theirs has been a destabilizing action. Neither Iowa nor New Hampshire are delegate-rich. Both are already discounted contests. Furthermore, both would take some additional hit if they go rogue in 2024 and more so when the president (likely) does not file to appear on the ballot in one or both states.2 Going rogue will, in turn, draw the ire of at least a portion of those among the DNC membership who will make future decisions on the calendar. [That says nothing of Iowa and/or New Hampshire laying the groundwork for some fringe candidate to win either or both rogue contests.]

If you are a prospective 2028 Democratic presidential candidate, are you going to be champing at the bit to get into the Granite state and start campaigning in 2026, for example? In some cases, yes! [Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA) has already dropped in on the Granite state and plans to return next month.] It is a potential badge of honor to campaign against the national party establishment sometimes. That potentially carries with it some cachet that may move voters in and outside of New Hampshire (and/or Iowa). But it is not clear at this point that one candidate bucking the national party is going to start a rush into the Granite state given all the caveats above. 


Other deterrents 
The delegate penalties assessed on candidates by the national parties for campaigning in a rogue state are one thing that may buttress against that. But the history of the post-reform era has shown that there are other tools at the disposal of, if not the national party, then other early states. In fact, it was actors in Iowa and New Hampshire over the last half century who demonstrated the effectiveness of those alternative tools: pledges to boycott rogue states threatening the position of the early states.

Only, now the shoe is on the other foot, and it would be New Hampshire (and maybe Iowa) who are the threats and not the threatened in this and future cycles. What if South Carolina repeats as the DNC-sanctioned first state in 2028? Are candidates in a competitive 2028 field really going to snub Palmetto state Democrats to face voters in Iowa and New Hampshire? The better question is perhaps whether South Carolina Democrats will allow the candidates to campaign in rogue states without paying a price. That is what Iowa and New Hampshire have done over the years. They have used the protection of the DNC waiver (granting them early status) to effectively blackmail candidates. "Sign this pledge to stay out of that rogue state or you are done here (in Iowa or New Hampshire)." It has been a threat to kill a candidate's campaign before it really starts. 

That strategy has worked for the traditional early state duo in the past -- see 1996 or 2012 for a couple of examples -- and it can be used against them in the future (if they do not have sanctioned early status). And there is a strong argument that such efforts -- candidate pledges -- against Iowa and/or New Hampshire would be more effective because neither state is exactly reflective of the current Democratic primary electorate. One can imagine South Carolina Democrats, for example, asking candidates to sign a pledge to focus on the Palmetto state and the African Americans that make up the majority of the primary electorate there instead of spending any time in unrepresentative states like Iowa or New Hampshire. And it does not have to be just South Carolina. Nevada could be that first state. Any state that the DNC could feasibly get into the first slot in 2028 could utilize some variation on the candidate pledge that Iowa and New Hampshire have used in the past.


War of attrition
Now, if one is a prospective presidential aspirant for 2028, that is a lot to consider. Iowa and New Hampshire are already discounted in the Democratic nomination process. In the DNC rules for 2024, both have been knocked from the positions on the calendar each has held throughout the post-reform era. New Hampshire (and maybe Iowa) appear(s) likely to go rogue next year, which weakens the hand of Granite state Democrats (and potentially those from the Hawkeye state) in the resulting 2028 calendar rules discussions. Then there are penalties and potential pledges from/to officially sanctioned first states to consider in the next cycle.

From the candidate perspective, what is a win in New Hampshire (and/or Iowa) worth at that point? In other words, at what point does a contest become so discounted as to be next to meaningless? 

That is the long game the DNC is playing. The point -- the attempted point anyway -- is to discount any rogue state to the degree that is becomes meaningless to any (or most) prospective candidates. However, getting to that point hinges on the DNC doing something it has not done in the past: following through on the rules (and penalties) all the way through the national convention. 

Democrats in New Hampshire are banking on that happening again in 2024. That the DNC will cave, hand New Hampshire back its initial apportionment of delegates and seat them all at the national convention in the name of party unity. Yet, that is perhaps an uncritical view of the position the national party is in for the 2024 cycle. All of those past instances of threats to penalize Iowa and/or New Hampshire or to not seat their delegates at the national convention occurred in open and competitive nomination cycles. There was a greater need to not only demonstrate party unity to a viewing nation but to create it after fractious nomination processes. Caving was arguably more necessary.

But those are not the conditions of the 2024 cycle. President Biden is not running unopposed, but neither is he likely to face off against any viable alternatives. He and the national party under him have also orchestrated these changes to the rules for 2024, and it stands to reason that they -- and the national convention to nominate Biden -- would be more driven to see the rules through in order to establish (if not entrench) the new early calendar rotation. [Yes, New Hampshire is of some value to the Democratic coalition of states in the electoral college, but those four electoral votes are more expendable than, say, ten in Wisconsin, or 11 in Arizona or 16 in Georgia, to name a few other important states in that calculus. And yes, there are down-ballot implications too as mentioned in the footnotes.]

A cycle in which an incumbent is running for renomination and has instituted a new rules regime is maybe not the cycle to hope that the national party just caves again. 

Look, if some of the conditions of 2024 are unknown, then they are even more greatly unknown for 2028. Things could fall just right for an antiestablishment candidate, for instance, in the next cycle who could parlay a win in even a discounted rogue New Hampshire primary into something more. Still, that would be a very narrow path for a winning candidate to navigate through and become nominee given everything that continues to increasingly discount the contests in Iowa and New Hampshire within the Democratic presidential nomination process. 

But first thing first: The next step in this is how the DNCRBC reacts to the delegate selection plans from Iowa and New Hampshire when those deliberations commence over the next month or so. 


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1 Incidentally, the calendar changes for 2024 will likely create some rogue states, but they will be a different kind of rogue state that is less likely to plunge the system into chaos. Some unnecessary headaches, sure. But chaos? That will take a lot more than a rogue New Hampshire primary and/or Iowa caucus.

2 "Some additional hit" is tough to define. In the context of New Hampshire in particular, the argument made there in the wake of national party calendar decisions has been that the Biden/DNC move to push the Granite state back in the order is only going to negatively affect Biden's chances in New Hampshire in the general election and hurt other New Hampshire Democrats down-ballot (but especially those holding federal office). It is a threat of mutually assured destruction -- from both sides. That will set off a battle to assign blame, the outcome of which is difficult to foresee.



--

Thursday, February 23, 2023

Rogue States Will Be the Norm as Long as the Parties Diverge on the Calendar

2024 is going to be different.


A look back to 2008
For the first time since the 2008 cycle, there will be a shake up to the beginning of the presidential primary calendar in 2024. And just as was the case fifteen years ago, it was the Democratic Party that instituted the changes

Then as now, the DNC sought to diversify the pre-window period on its calendar, augmenting the traditional Iowa/New Hampshire start with the addition of contests in two more states. Just as was the case during 2022, the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee (DNCRBC) invited state parties to pitch the panel in 2006 on why their state contest should be added to the early calendar in the upcoming primary season. Much of the focus centered on adding smaller states but also providing some balance in terms of region and demographics. And finally, part of the calculus also honed in on the idea of adding another caucus state in between Iowa and New Hampshire and another primary thereafter but before Super Tuesday. 

There are more than a few parallels between those criteria and the set used in 2022 by the current-day DNCRBC. But there are some differences as well. Democrats were the out-party in 2006, and parties in the White House tend to do less tinkering. Also, Democrats may have been a bit shrewder in their choices of additions for 2008. South Carolina was already a state that had carved out a spot in the early Republican calendar over the preceding quarter of a century. And Nevada was a caucus state at the time. Both featured state parties that made the primary/caucus scheduling decisions rather than state governments. Unlike in a situation where the state government sets a primary date, a move by national Democrats to add South Carolina and/or Nevada to their early calendar for 2008 did not necessarily drag Republicans in those states into the mix. 

Of course, Palmetto state Republicans already had a presidential primary that was an established part of the early Republican calendar. And Nevada Republicans joined the fun with January 2008 caucuses that skirted Republican National Committee (RNC) penalties. There was no RNC rule that required states in 2008 to bind national convention delegates based on a statewide presidential preference vote. Silver state Republicans and those in Iowa, for that matter, conducted a preference vote during precinct caucuses, but that had no direct bearing on the delegates chosen to attend the next stages of the caucus/convention process, nor ultimately those delegates who represented either state at the national convention. 

But it worked. Perhaps it was dumb luck, but it worked. Nevada and South Carolina, with minimal (although not nonexistent) implementation headaches, became not just established but institutionalized parts of the early calendar in both parties' processes. And that was despite the fact that both were flip-flopped in the other party's order; South Carolina third and Nevada fourth in the Republican process and the inverse on the Democratic side.


How 2024 is different and how that increases the odds of rogue states
That is a different story than the one that has played out in the lead up to when the latest primary calendar decisions were made in 2022-23. And it is different for a number of reasons. 

First, Democrats entered the review process for the 2024 rules and the primary calendar saying that no early calendar slots were guaranteed. All four (or five) were up for grabs. That meant that Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina had to make their cases before the DNCRBC just like every other interested state party. And for the first time since specific carve outs were added to the DNC rules for Iowa and New Hampshire for the 1984 cycle, Iowa, and likely New Hampshire, will have no waiver from the national party to be a part of the pre-window lineup. That necessarily creates two potential rogues states in one fell swoop.

Second, recall the background on the selection of South Carolina and Nevada in 2008. In both situations, it was state parties making the decisions on where primaries or caucuses in the Palmetto and Silver states ended up on the calendar. South Carolina obviously remains the same as it was in 2008 (with respect to the decision makers). That is part of the reason South Carolina Democrats got the nod to go first for 2024 in the Democratic process. Meanwhile, Nevada, under Democratic control in 2021, shifted from party-run caucuses to a state-run presidential primary. That move mirrors a push by the national party away from caucuses and toward state-run primaries. 

But while the national party has advocated for more state-run processes in order to maximize participation, that has limited the DNC's options in terms changing its calendar without potentially creating problems for Republicans in their process. Those problems are best highlighted by the Democrats' insertion of Michigan into the pre-window, an act that puts Michigan Republicans in the crosshairs of the RNC rules. Granted, this is a two-way street. The RNC decision to stick with the traditional Iowa-New Hampshire-South Carolina-Nevada lead off has impacted Democrats. It has created potential problems in Iowa and New Hampshire with both state parties, leaning on existing state, signaling they are likely to go rogue and hold contests concurrent with the Republican in their respective states. And unless the DNC tweaks its approach to Georgia, the Peach state primary will not be a part of the pre-window at all. Georgia definitely will not go on February 13 as planned.  

Another part of the 2024 picture that differs from 2008 comes from who is doing the rules tinkering. It is unusual for an in-party to so fundamentally reshape a seemingly ingrained part of the process. But what that points to is how much sway the incumbent president tends to hold over the system that will renominate him or her. Typically an incumbent is content to move forward with a nomination system that largely mimics the one that got him or her to the White House in the first place. That may produce changes from a nomination cycle to the renomination cycle, but they usually are not big changes. 

But what if they were? The 2024 cycle is testing that. It is the incumbent president who is testing that. Indeed, without the input of the president on the 2024 primary calendar, the DNCRBC seemed to be heading in the direction of something that would have knocked Iowa out altogether, bumped the other three early states up a notch (maybe with some additional shuffling) and added Michigan to the end of the pre-window as a midwestern replacement for the caucuses in the Hawkeye state. President Biden had something else in mind and the DNCRCB and ultimately the full DNC fell in line

And that has implications for both parties' calendars. More importantly, that has implications for how orderly those calendars are in coming together. Questions remain on both sides. 

Finally, while all of the above seemingly points the finger squarely at the Democrats as instigators in all of this, Republicans have played a role as well. Necessity is the mother of invention and, in fact, brought the national parties together in the time after the chaos of the 2008 calendar. Both saw value in not starting the process in January (or for not allowing states other than the first four to conduct contests in February). And they informally brokered a deal. FHQ often cites that and uses the "informally brokered" language, but here is what that meant in the rules. 

In the amended rules for the 2012 cycle, the RNC added language that created a specific carve out in Rule 15(b)(1) for Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina. In the previous cycle (2008), only New Hampshire and South Carolina had those exemptions. [Iowa and Nevada did not need them. Neither allocated any national convention delegates to the national convention in their precinct caucuses.] That aligned the Republicans with the Democratic pre-window calendar for the most part. Again, recall the South Carolina/Nevada flip-flop between the parties.

Moreover, the RNC added one other rule, Rule 15(b)(3):
If the Democratic National Committee fails to adhere to a presidential primary schedule with the dates set forth in Rule 15(b)(1) of these Rules (February 1 and first Tuesday in March), then Rule 15(b) shall revert to the Rules as adopted by the 2008 Republican National Convention.
It is not common for one party's nomination rules to cite the other party. But for 2012, the basic outline of the Republican calendar hinged on what national Democrats did. Basically, if the DNC did not adopt rules that called for a February 1 start to the calendar for the early states and a first Tuesday in March start for every other state, then the RNC would revert to the rules it used in 2008. That would have snapped back to the RNC using a calendar that allowed all but the exempt states to start in February pushing Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Nevada into January. Yes, that happened anyway because Florida broke the rules again in 2012. But that was not a function of this brokered deal between the parties. It was because the RNC penalties were not severe enough.

However, once the RNC got their penalties right in 2016 with the addition of the super penalty, that was it. That was the high-water mark for cooperation between the parties. And the agreement held through the 2020 cycle or until the Democrats walked away for 2024. 

The break was about more than just the Democrats going their own way with a fundamentally different early calendar lineup for 2024. The truth is there was not much for them to walk away from. The dialog that had developed out of that deal brokered fifteen years ago gradually declined over time. It happens. And it happened because the players involved changed. Leadership on the RNC Rules Committee changed again in 2017 and interest on the Republican side mostly died with it. There was still Republican interest in the dialog but it was no longer coming from players who were directly involved on the RNC Rules Committee. 

And that lack of communication was something DNCRBC co-Chair Jim Roosevelt noted in the December meeting when the 2024 calendar plan was initially adopted by the panel. In responding to concerns from Scott Brennan, Iowa DNC and DNCRBC member, about the potential for a split between the two national parties on Iowa's calendar position leading to chaos, Roosevelt said that the Republicans were not open to coordinating this time. And that has been true for the last two cycles.

That matters. It is a part of the fuller picture. And as long as there is no (even informal) coordination on the matter between the two national parties, the more there are going to be rogue state situations like the ones that are likely to mark the 2024 cycle in Iowa, Michigan and New Hampshire (if not Georgia).


But what even is a rogue state?
If Iowa or Michigan or New Hampshire are rogue in 2024 in one party's process or another, then that is different from the calendar rogues of the recent past. Those three states are unlike Florida and Michigan in 2008 and unlike Arizona, Florida and Michigan in 2012. State actors in Arizona, Florida and Michigan made decisions to break the rules. State laws were changed ahead of 2008 to push Florida and Michigan into noncompliance, and they were not changed before 2012 to comply with the new (and later) calendar start codified in both parties' rules for that cycle. 

Contrast that with the situations in Iowa, Michigan and New Hampshire for 2024. Republicans in Iowa and New Hampshire and Democrats in Michigan all have the blessings of their national parties to conduct early contests next year. Their counterparts across the aisle do not. And in the case of Michigan Republicans and New Hampshire Democrats, they have no real recourse if they want to use the state-run primary. If partisans on the other side move or keep the primaries where they are under state law, they are stuck to a large degree. 

That is a different kind of rogue. That is a rogue that is created by the discrepancy between the two national parties' presidential primary calendars. It forces the state parties in that situation to either take the penalties or to pay for their own party-run process (which is a penalty in its own right). But as long as the calendar divide exists -- and especially if Democrats continue to reexamine and reshuffle their early calendar lineup -- then this type of rogue state is likely to continue to cause problems on one side or the other. And that says nothing of the possibility of Republicans following suit and shuffling their early calendar in cycles to come. 

As of now, there is little evidence that there is any movement from other states to go rogue in the old fashion. In West Virginia, there are bills to create a separate presidential primary and schedule it for February, out of compliance with both parties' rules. But that is it. There is no concerted effort to rush the gates and go early against the rules. However, just because there is no conventional rogue activity now, or even in this cycle, it does not mean that states will not try to exploit the calendar differences between the two national parties in the futures should they persist. 

It is that sort of unraveling of the steady state informally coordinated between the national parties a decade and a half ago that should trouble decision makers on the national level.

Monday, February 6, 2023

Raffensperger Weighs in on Early Georgia Presidential Primary

For the first time since the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee (DNCRBC) officially elevated Georgia in the discussions of early presidential primary states in December, Peach state Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger (R) has publicly shared his thoughts. 

As the AP's Bill Barrow reports, Raffensperger likes the idea: 
“Georgia would be a great early primary state in 2028. It has a good cross-section of engaged voters from both parties."
And therein lies the rub. Georgia's fate on the Democratic calendar for 2024 remains unresolved and state Democrats have until June 3, 2023 to find a fix in order receive a pre-window waiver from the national party. But the problem is that the two national parties' calendars are misaligned more than usual for 2024. The RNC voted in April 2022 on amendments to the 2024 presidential nomination rules and opted to stick with the early calendar the party has used every cycle since 2008. 

That leaves Georgia on the outside looking in on that side of the equation. Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Nevada will once again be the four early states in the Republican process, and the national party now has no means of changing it. All rules changes had to be made by September 30, 2022. But once amendments were adopted by the national party last April, that was it. There is nothing the RNC can do at this point to change its calendar.

But as Raffensperger noted in his brief comments, things could be different for the Peach state when planning for 2028 commences. 

However, an early position in 2024 is still not necessarily out of the question for Georgia. There is just very little wiggle room at this point. The rules are locked in. But Raffensperger's office has set the criteria for cooperation from their office on the primary scheduling matter. In reaction to the DNCRBC calendar vote in December, Jordan Fuchs, deputy secretary of state set the parameters:
"We’ve been clear: This needs to be equitable so that no one loses a single delegate and needs to take place on the same day to save taxpayer funds."
Georgia can hold a single primary for both parties as early as March 1 under RNC rules. Any earlier than that and Republicans in the Peach state would be vulnerable to the RNC super penalty for timing violations. That would knock the Georgia delegation to the Milwaukee convention down to just twelve delegates. 

Democrats' efforts to push the primary up to the February 13 position prescribed in the new DNC rules are likely to be futile given those penalties. And now that Michigan has passed legislation to move into its February 27 spot -- not to mention that the DNC has now also adopted its rules -- flipping Georgia and Michigan in the order seems out of the question. 

However, if the DNC is serious about nudging the Georgia primary into the pre-window and it does not mind a Michigan-and-then-Georgia pairing to close the pre-window, then perhaps the Georgia primary could fit into the space between the Michigan primary on February 27 and Super Tuesday on March 5.

Saturday, March 2 would work. 

However, wedging Georgia into that spot creates a potential spacing issue with the Michigan and Georgia contests so close together on top of Super Tuesday. That spacing is less consequential on the Democratic side if President Biden seeks reelection and faces only nominal opposition. 

But that still leaves the issue of how a primary on that date fits into the Republican calculus both nationally and in Georgia. Peach state Republicans, of which Raffensperger is one, may like the idea of the Georgia primary playing a role similar to what South Carolina's did in the Democratic process in 2020. From the same Saturday-before-Super-Tuesday position, the Palmetto state primary catapulted then-candidate Biden into Super Tuesday victorious. It is an outcome that has been viewed in retrospect as decisive. And that is not a bad spot in which to potentially be. 

Of course, that may not be the case in the Republican process and especially with a possible Michigan primary just a few days prior to a hypothetical March 2 Georgia primary. And that Michigan Republican primary on February 27 is "possible" because the Michigan GOP faces the same issue Georgia Republicans would encounter on February 13: penalties from the national party. Michigan Republicans may yet opt out of the state-run primary and hold later caucuses that comply with RNC rules. 

The RNC may also not be on board with any of this. Signaling a green light to a Georgia move -- again, within the rules -- to Saturday, March 2 may set off a race toward a Super Saturday among other states. And the national party may or may not want that complication. Granted, Raffensperger has under Georgia law until December 1 to set the date of the Georgia presidential primary. There is no rush. That may help mitigate some of the potential for a rush to March 2. 

Still, that is a lot of moving parts, not to mention the number of interested decision makers, to pull something like that off in such a narrow window. But at this point, if Georgia is to be a part of the pre-window on the Democratic side, then it may be March 2 or bust. 

Honestly, it always has been.

Sunday, February 5, 2023

OK. The DNC Has a New and Different Calendar for 2024. Now What?


But as noted in this space a day ago, the adoption of those rules merely ends one chapter in the sequence and ushers in a new one. The national parties have now finalized their rules for the 2024 cycle, and now the ball in the court of the states, both state governments and state parties.1 And they will react. They already are. State legislators have been filing legislation to change the dates of presidential primaries. Democratic state parties have, no doubt, been crafting draft delegate selection plans that will be released as winter transitions to spring 2023. And even on the Republican side, state party officer elections are and will be occurring and (delegation allocation) rules tweaks will be considered.

Much of this is and will be routine. 

Some of it will not be. Again, as noted a day ago on the heels of the DNC adoption of the new calendar rules package, the national party has followed a divergent path in the 2024 cycle to this point. And it is more than breaking with tradition and shunting Iowa and New Hampshire to later spots (in the rules) on the primary calendar than either has typically occupied. But that is where the focus will be in the coming weeks and months. And understandably so. As the Republican invisible primary heats up and candidates enter the race, there projects be a dearth of stories on the Democratic side. If Biden jumps back in, as expected, and receives only token opposition, then the only game in town will be the continuing calendar drama over Iowa and New Hampshire (and to a lesser degree, Georgia). News of the Biden campaign build out will certainly break, but the calendar drama will contrast with the picture of a party ostensibly united behind the president.

But one need not peer into the fog of a crystal ball to attempt to discern where this calendar kerfuffle is going. It has become clear that both sides -- the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the state Democratic parties in Iowa and/or New Hampshire -- are going to dig in for a protracted battle. But that does not mean that news content creators and consumers need to fall into the trap of repeatedly checking the pulse of a predictable drama. 

Look, Iowa and New Hampshire Democrats will both have to submit draft delegate selection plans to the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee (DNCRBC) by May 3, 2023. The Iowa Democratic Party will definitely have the ability to specify a particular date on which their caucuses will occur in 2024. Whether the party actually does specify a date by that time or dodges and leaves that blank -- waiting, as has been the standard early state protocol, for the certainty of where other states may fall on the calendar -- remains to be seen. But two of the three possible outcomes point toward defiance. Leaving the date blank or planning for January caucuses (in order to stay ahead of other states) in the plan rather than falling in line under the new rules are not provable, positive steps toward compliance. 


There is going to be defiance of the national party rules on the part of the Democratic parties in Iowa and/or New Hampshire or there will not be. And there will be a response from the DNCRBC. If defiance is the chosen path, then that reaction will not only be to strip both states of half their allotment of national convention delegates, but to remove the entire apportionment. 

This is pretty clear. ...right now.

It will not really be revelatory then in May (for Iowa) and June (when New Hampshire's waiver review concludes). It will not really be news. Yet, there are ways that the narrative can be pushed further that can benefit those following along with this story. Here are some questions that both news content creators and consumers can ask in the coming days, weeks and months of both entrenched interests in this seemingly inevitable back and forth.

Questions to ask now that there is an official outline for the 2024 presidential primary calendar
For both Iowa and New Hampshire Democrats:
What is the penalty for not following state law?

For New Hampshire Democrats:
Why can't the state party use a party-run option that complies with the DNC rules for 2024?
Both of these questions get to the heart of the typical defense in both Iowa and New Hampshire. Both parties use state law as a shield in their efforts to protect their respective first-in-the-nation statuses. Yes, there is a state law in Iowa that compels state parties to hold their precinct caucuses eight days before any other contest. And in New Hampshire the law calls for the state-run primary to be scheduled by the secretary of state for a time a week before any other similar contest. 

But what happens if either state party breaks those laws? 

The answer is clear in Iowa. Not much. No, it is less than that: nothing. There is clarity on that because both state parties have already broken that state law twice in the last four cycles. The caucuses were just five days before the New Hampshire primary in 2008.2 And they were just seven days before them four years later. And never mind the fact that Louisiana held an early primary in 1996 that was before both Iowa and New Hampshire that year and also allocated a sizable chunk of their delegates.

What price did Iowa political parties pay in those years? None. In all cases, there was no state sanction, and the state parties were able to continue drawing most of the candidate attention and reap the usual benefits of being first. In Iowa's case, the state law is only as strong as the unified state parties standing behind it. If either or both fold, then the law is meaningless (with no penalties).

Things are slightly different in New Hampshire where the contest -- the presidential primary -- is a state-funded and run process. Unlike in Iowa, that ties the hands of the state parties in ways that one currently sees. New Hampshire Democrats are powerless to change the state law to alter either the primary date/scheduling mechanism or add no-excuse absentee voting. Republicans control the levers of power in the Granite state. 

But what is keeping New Hampshire Democrats from opting out of the presidential primary and turning to a party-run process that complies with the new national party rules? Again, as is the case in the Iowa example above, it is not clear that there is any significant roadblock to that sort of change. Well, there is an obstacle. In this case, it is the defense mechanism that is triggered in New Hampshire every time the primary's first-in-the-nation status is threatened. Very simply -- and clearly -- few in New Hampshire want to let that go. 

So, just as is the case in Iowa, the New Hampshire law is only as strong as the parties willing to band together and stand behind it. Any deviation in Granite state by either or both parties undermines the law for future cycles.

Of course, it is worth noting that while New Hampshire Democrats could opt to hold a party-run contest of some sort, it is not clear that taking such a route would allow them to keep their pre-window waiver. Recall that the conditions to be granted that waiver require New Hampshire Democrats to change state laws they cannot possibly alter from the minority. 

And that is another question to pose to New Hampshire Democrats: What would the party do if it did hold majorities in the General Court and the governor's mansion as well? That is a hypothetical that Democrats in the Granite state are saved from having to directly answer in this cycle due to the partisan realities in the state at the moment. But that answer would be enlightening. 

That said, there was a hint of an answer in the comments Donna Soucy, Democratic leader in the New Hampshire state Senate and DNC member, made in defense of the first-in-the-nation primary before the full DNC on Saturday. While she noted the futility of Democratic actions in the legislature, she did say that legislation addressing no-excuse absentee voting had been advanced in the last legislative session only to be vetoed by Governor Sununu (R). She went on to say that legislation was in the works or already out there to do the same in this current session. That is a good faith effort on the part of New Hampshire Democrats. That is a provable, positive step toward one of the changes they are being asked by the DNCRBC to make. The effort may be doomed, but it is evidence of Democrats in the state at least working toward the change called for in order to be granted a pre-window waiver. 

But if Democrats in the New Hampshire General Court can make those efforts on no-excuse absentee voting, then why not on changing the date and scheduling mechanism for the presidential primary? Soucy did not go there in her comments to the DNC. And that is a tell. There is no intention to make those changes. To do so is to undermine the current law which would weaken New Hampshire in these fights in the future. And honestly, it would be bad politics locally. No Democrat in the Granite state is going to hand that -- trying to change the first-in-the-nation law -- to Republicans on a silver platter. They just are not. They cannot. It would be a political loser for them.

In the end and in the context of the back and forth between New Hampshire and the DNC, that is not going to matter. All the DNCRBC is going to look at are the rules and whether New Hampshire Democrats have made good faith efforts at provable, positive steps toward the changes required to be granted a pre-window waiver. All of this -- for both Iowa and New Hampshire -- circles back to the fact that neither has a specific guaranteed waiver for the first time since 1980. That is a key difference in how the DNC will deal with both moving forward.

Speaking of the DNC, there are questions that the national party could be asked that can advance this story beyond a simple he said/she said drama as well.
For the DNC:
How is the party going to enforce this in the end if either or both states go rogue?

How does the party do that in a way that preserves the new system -- the rotation -- for future cycles?
These are more difficult questions to answer because they imagine a situation further on down the line once Iowa and New Hampshire have acted (or not acted). However, if one assumes defiance on the part of Democrats in both traditional kick-off states, then the answers become a little less murky. 

If Iowa and New Hampshire Democrats fail to demonstrate that provable, positive steps are being taken to comply with the national party rules, then as was mentioned above, it is likely that the DNCRBC follows its 2008 blueprint and strips Iowa and/or New Hampshire of all of their delegates. Those signals are already out there. The panel is already communicating that to state parties.

The conundrum, of course, is that while it may be comparatively easy for the DNCRBC to levy a full delegation penalty on both Iowa and New Hampshire during primary season, it is a different matter entirely to enforce that in a way that preserves the effectiveness of the penalties for future cycles. To do that -- to penalize the states in a way that lasts beyond 2024 -- the convention would likely have to opt not to seat delegations from either or both states. 

Perhaps it is enough for the party to send the same signal it did with Florida and Michigan in 2008. A intra-primary season penalty, though, may only serve to delay an inevitable clash until a time in which it is more difficult to deal: a competitive nomination cycle. The stakes are relatively low in 2024 with an incumbent president seemingly on the cusp of entering a race (that does not appear to be much of a race). 

If the national party and the president are serious about uprooting Iowa and New Hampshire and changing the way that the pre-window lineup is set every cycle, then it will have to grapple with how seriously they want to sanction both states for potential rules violations. To make the change -- to move to a quadrennial possibility of a rotation of states in the pre-window -- then it will likely require the convention to not seat delegations from offending states. And the convention is a distinct set of decision makers. It is not exactly the same as the DNC. There is some overlap, but not complete overlap between the two. But a presumptive nominee, and an incumbent president at that, does have some say in orchestrating any convention that nominates him or her. Biden would theoretically have some say in the matter if push comes to shove with Iowa and/or New Hampshire in the summer of 2024. 

But will he? Would Biden and those around him ultimately go as far as to not seat entire delegations elected/selected to those positions by contests that violated national party rules? That is the part that has proven difficult in the past and part of what Iowa and/or New Hampshire are banking on in the 2024 cycle. The president will not need either state to win the nomination at the convention, but a unified convention is what nominees and parties aim for if they can get it to kick off a general election run. That is what the early states would try to exploit. 

The question then becomes whether there is some middle ground that can deliver a punishment, the effects of which can be carried over to future cycles to preserve the new system the DNC is attempting to establish. Is there something less than not seating a rogue delegation that would also be effective? Seating those delegations, but stripping them of their voting rights on roll call? On other matters like the platform or convention rules? None are necessarily good looks for a party that bills itself as a defender of voting rights (even if the party is following the rules codified for the 2024 cycle). There is no easy fix that makes enforcement foolproof to a degree that likely fully delivers a message to would-be rogue states in future cycles. It is tough given the timing of things and the incentives at various points along the timeline. 

Finally, there is one more question that could be asked of the DNC but likely applies more generally:
Do any of the interested parties involved in this turn to the courts?
It is not clear that the DNC or the Biden reelection campaign would directly turn to the courts to seek a remedy to this. It is, after all, an internal party matter. But if done early enough, the courts could offer a path to compliance. Remember the 1984 experience

Mondale campaign operatives in Iowa took Iowa Democrats to court, fearful that Mondale supporters in the Hawkeye state would be materially harmed at the convention if the caucuses in 1984 were too early in violation of the DNC rules that cycle. Threats to not seat the delegation would have meant Iowa voices would have been left unrepresented at the convention. The problem for those who brought the suit was not that the claim lack merit of that the claimants lacked standing. Rather, the case came so late -- in late 1983 -- that other candidates/other campaigns had already built infrastructure as if Iowa's caucuses would be in the (technically) noncompliant position. 

But if a case came earlier in the year -- like after Iowa or New Hampshire submitted rogue delegate selection plans signaling their intent -- and if the case was brought in a year in which an incumbent president were running for reelection against token opposition (with little demonstrable campaign infrastructure in place), what then? Could the courts force on Iowa and/or New Hampshire Democratic parties remedial actions including party-run processes that comply with national party rules. 

The catch is finding anyone in Iowa or New Hampshire who is still a Biden supporter and who is legitimately concerned about themselves or their state's voice being fully heard at the Democratic National Convention. After yesterday's DNC vote on the calendar package, there may not be too many folks left who fit that category. 

Nonetheless, it is a questions worth asking. One that, when combined with the others above, advances what is likely to be a messy back and forth between the state parties and the DNC. There will be he said/she said drama to that mess, but it would be helpful to push beyond the temptation to regurgitate that story every painful step of the way. The questions posed here get at factors beyond that sort of superficial account. 


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1 In truth, there is some overlap between these two phases. It does not neatly transition from one chapter to another. While most state governments wait until after the national party rules are set, some act before that point in the cycle. It is just that there is more legislative urgency on the issue of presidential primary scheduling, for example, in the lead up to the next presidential primary -- typically after a midterm election and before the presidential primaries commence -- than at other times. 

2 Technically, the Iowa Republican caucuses were just two days before the caucuses that allocated two-thirds of national convention delegates in Wyoming that same year. 


Saturday, February 4, 2023

DNC Adopts 2024 Primary Calendar Plan

As expected, the Democratic National Committee on Saturday adopted the calendar rules package brought before it by the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee (DNCRBC) at the party's winter meeting in Philadelphia.

Over the course of the general session, DNC members from both Iowa and New Hampshire rose in opposition to the changes that would remove the Hawkeye state from the early window altogether and replace the caucuses atop the Democratic presidential primary calendar with the South Carolina primary. However, other than a smattering of nays across the room, the proposed plan to reshape the early nomination calendar passed with near unanimous support. 

The vote brings to an end this chapter of the process. And it is an unusual end to the preliminary chapter the national parties write every four years. Typically in the Democratic process, the national party would have adopted all of its rules for the cycle by the time it held its midterm year summer meeting. And while the DNC did adopt the bulk of the 2024 rules in September 2022, it saved until after the midterm elections the decision concerning which states would receive waivers to hold pre-window contests. 

Moreover, that decision -- which states would be granted waivers -- broke with tradition as well. Rather than continue with the process in place since 2006 of automatically awarding waivers to Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina, the DNC opened up the process in 2022 to any state Democratic party that wanted to pitch the DNCRBC on why it should be included in the early calendar. 20 states and territories, including the four traditional carve-outs, applied and 17, again, including the four traditionally early states, were invited to make presentations to the DNCRBC in the summer of 2022.

The criteria the DNCRBC operated under during that process were simple enough. The panel sought states that offered diversity (racial, regional and economic), competitive battlegrounds where primary stage campaigning would potentially pay dividends in a general election and afforded a feasibility of primary or caucus movement. Most of the traditional carve-outs had issues. Iowa, following a challenging 2020 caucuses, was already up against it without the additional strain of the party's diversity focus. New Hampshire was too. South Carolina did not fit the mold in terms of general election competitiveness. Only Nevada, a state that had already shifted from a caucus system to state-run primary before 2022 -- another preference of the national party dating back to the 2020 cycle -- seemed to tick all of the boxes.

But again, it was unusual that the national party waited until after the midterms to select the early state lineup for the 2024 calendar. Yet, with control of state governments at stake in those elections, feasibility of movement for a number of applicants was in question.

As the midterms passed, Democrats were left in control in a number of states, but the White House had yet to publicly share its thoughts on the rules; typically an integral component in any in-party's calculus. The precedent set throughout much of the post-reform era has been for presidents to more or less carry over the same rules that got them the nomination in the first place. But on the eve of the DNCRBC meeting to adopt a waivers package for early 2024 states, the Biden White House broke with that protocol, proposing to push Iowa's caucuses out of the early window and shunt New Hampshire into a slot alongside one primary (Nevada) and behind another (South Carolina). 

And that is where things stand after the full DNC has vote in favor of the calendar changes. South Carolina and Nevada are locked in and Michigan has passed legislation to move its primary into the February 27 position called for in the new DNC rules.1 And in that regard, the DNC is ahead of schedule (in some respects) compared to other cycles. Three of the five early states are locked into position without risk of further maneuvering because of the actions of states around them in the pre-window. That should tamp down on calendar chaos to some degree as 2023 progresses.

As this phase -- the national party phase -- of the rules process (mostly) comes to a close, that is where the Democratic side is. [The Republican process continues to have Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Nevada, in that order, as the lead-off states on its calendar.] Three early states are in position on the Democratic primary calendar as February 2023 begins, and two states are not. Georgia and New Hampshire now have until June 3 to comply with the DNC waiver requirements or forfeit those waivers and their positions on the early calendar.  

Democratic state parties will begin in the next month or two to publicly share their draft delegate selection plans before finalizing them and sending them off to the DNCRBC by May 3 for review and approval. Although there remains a national party component, this is the state/state party phase of the rules sequence. Much will be said about Georgia and New Hampshire until June, but other states will be maneuvering with respect to their rules (state parties) and calendar positions (mainly state governments).

But it should not be lost on anyone what the Democratic National Committee has done. It has not only broken with its regular rhythms for setting the pre-window lineup of states, it has completely revamped that lineup. And that is a big deal. It is a big deal considering the stink that New Hampshire has already raised and the backlash that Granite state Democrats and those in Iowa will likely to continue to push in this next phase if not into 2024. That entrenched duopoly has proven difficult for national parties to combat because the wherewithal simply is not typically there. Internally (within the party electorate) popular incumbent presidents usually want to glide to renomination in order to prepare for a grueling reelection campaign. Those administrations do not typically invite trouble. In some respects, however, that is what the Biden administration and DNC have done. Yet, that is exactly the sort of "low stakes" environment needed to make those types of rules changes; when the competition is low and new precedents can be set with future cycles in mind. That is what is at stake moving forward and why the DNC is likely to dig in just as much as Iowa and New Hampshire are.  

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Below is a live thread on the DNC winter meeting general session when the party was considering the calendar package. 

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1 There is a further implementation complication that will require the Michigan legislature to wrap up its business earlier than usual in 2023 so that the primary bill can take effect in time for the presidential primary in the Great Lakes state to actually fall on February 27.

Thursday, February 2, 2023

How Much Will Democrats' Primary Calendar Change Away from Iowa Affect the Overall Process?

Thursday's episode of the New York Times podcast, The Daily, raised the curtain on changes the Democratic National Committee (DNC) are about to make to the party's presidential primary calendar this weekend in Philadelphia. In A Revolution in How Democrats Pick a President, host Michael Barbaro and Times national political reporter, Adam Nagourney, detailed the important role the Iowa caucuses have played in past Democratic presidential nomination races and what a shift away from that -- from that early calendar tradition -- might mean for 2024 and beyond. And their conversation dipped into familiar territory for those who read this site with any regularity: the unintended consequences of national party rules changes in the presidential nomination process.

Only, the discussion landed on a narrative that pitted diversity gains against retail politics lost. There are definitely trade-offs to the altered primary calendar lineup the DNC is on the cusp of adopting this weekend, but it is not clear that this is one of them. But it was not just about retail politics. The basic story Barbaro and Nagourney told was one of the post-1968 changes to the Democratic presidential nomination process. It was that classic story of the nomination decision being pulled out of smoke-filled rooms and out of the hands of party bosses, decentralized and given over to rank-and-file voters in primaries and caucuses. Losing Iowa and replacing it with South Carolina, in their telling, is to take a step away from a system in which every candidate has a chance. And if one has followed any of the backlash from New Hampshire since the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee adopted the calendar change proposal in December, that should be a familiar storyline. 

But telling the story the South Carolina for Iowa swap in that frame ignores a number of important factors.  First, focus on the states involved. There is now half a century's worth of stories like Jimmy Carter's or Barack Obama's in Iowa; stories of them and countless other candidates of both parties meeting voters, shaking hands, kissing babies and hearing policy concerns. There is a certain mythology that has built up around it all. And that mythology is a part of the fabric of the presidential nomination process in the United States. 

Yet, it is not as if South Carolina has not been a part of the early calendar -- since 1980 on the Republican side and since 2008 in the Democratic process -- and developed its own style of retail politics; its own stories. And even though South Carolina has been behind Iowa and New Hampshire in the order, as the process has become increasingly nationalized, candidate campaign footprints in states deeper into the calendar (like South Carolina and Nevada) have only grown. Yes, South Carolina is larger than Iowa in population, but it is not as if national Democrats were moving California's primary to the front of the queue. 

Second, and on a related note, the emphasis Barbaro and Nagourney place on method of delegate selection -- primary or caucus -- lacked context as well. Part of the story they told was one of trading in the intimacy of the caucuses in Iowa for a primary in a larger state where candidates would inevitably have to focus on advertisements to reach more primary voters. Well, that leaves out the fact that the DNC has been moving away from caucuses for at least the last two cycles. 2020 saw just three states with caucuses before the pandemic hit. And in attempting to protect their first-in-the-nation position on the calendar for 2024, Iowa Democrats had pledged to move to an all-mail, absentee system for the "caucuses." In 2024, Iowa is not even going to be the Iowa of old depicted in the podcast. 

In making those changes, Democrats at both the national and state level have been and are moving toward more participation and less of what Barbaro and Nagourney called the "intimacy" of the caucus process. But that confuses the intimacy of the assembled caucus process with the closeness of retail politics. Some of that may, in fact, be lost in the transition from Iowa to South Carolina. But one does not yet know how much, if any, that will change in 2024. There has not been a cycle in the post-reform era in which Iowa and New Hampshire have not led the pack, and thus no baseline for comparison. And again, South Carolina is not California, and it is smaller than Iowa in terms of area. Retail politics can happen, and has happened, in the Palmetto state.

Look, this calendar change the DNC is likely to adopt in the coming days is a BFD. Lost retail politics and decreased odds of the little guy rising to the nomination may be part of those changes. 

...to some degree.

But that will not be apparent that from a largely uncontested Democratic nomination race in 2024. There may be some shift to the air war over the ground war as it were, but it is not like the party is completely abandoning the concept of an on ramp to the nomination that starts in small states. After all, the beginning of the proposed calendar is still composed of small states. One could argue about the cluster of early, small contests in the first four days with respect to retail politics. But that is far less likely to be of much consequence when the president is likely to seek the Democratic nomination again and do so with (probably) only token opposition.

And to be honest, any decrease in the chances of the Jimmy Carter's of the world in future presidential nomination races is probably less about party elites replacing Iowa and more about the ongoing nationalization of the nomination process; something that the national parties are limited to control anyway.

Wednesday, January 25, 2023

DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee Extends Waiver Compliance Window for Georgia and New Hampshire

The DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee (DNCRBC) met remotely on Wednesday, January 25 to consider extensions for Georgia and New Hampshire to comply with the national party's proposed calendar for 2024. In order to attain waivers to appear in the early calendar slots reserved for them, Democrats in Georgia and New Hampshire must either complete the requirements put before them by the DNCRBC or show provable, positive steps toward their completion by June 3, 2023.

In Georgia's case, Peach state Democrats must get some buy-in from Republicans in the state who control the scheduling of the presidential primary. There are ways of getting there with Republican help -- the Georgia secretary of state's office has set the criteria -- but it will likely take the DNCRBC bending a little on the president's vision for the calendar adopted in December.

But Georgia did not come up much in the context of the conversation among DNCRBC members. Instead, much of the period in which the floor was open for comment was dominated by the roadblocks obstructing New Hampshire's path to compliance with the waiver mandates and the reaction in the Granite state to the DNCRBC's adoption of the calendar proposal. DNCRBC member from New Hampshire, Joanne Dowdell, delivered the familiar arguments that have made the rounds over the last month from the Granite state. Her's was a simple recitation of the facts. Basically: New Hampshire Democrats are stuck; stuck between a state law that places the decision on the presidential primary's date in the hands of the secretary of state and a Republican-controlled state government with a demonstrated lack of interest in changing either the primary scheduling law or adding no-excuse absentee voting. Folks outside of the New Hampshire Democratic Party organization in the state may be more agitated and use more inflammatory arguments as this process continues, but the state party itself will likely continue along the above lines. 

What is likely to be the dug-in position of the DNCRBC, if not the DNC, with regard to the ongoing New Hampshire situation is something voiced by DC DNCRBC member, Mo Elleithee. His contention was that New Hampshire has not over the course of the last five decades been the first contest in the primary calendar order. In fact, the Granite state has been second and has had that position protected by the DNC (explicitly starting in 1984). The current plan continues to protect that (second) position and asks that New Hampshire share the space with Nevada. 

Of course, that is the crux of the problem. New Hampshire Democrats cannot comply with that. ...if they intend to operate under the state law. Unmentioned by Dowdell was any potential alternate course the state party could take to select/allocate delegates and come into compliance with a calendar plan that will not be fully adopted until June at the earliest. The DNCRBC may be trying to nudge New Hampshire Democrats in that direction, but they may not find a receptive audience. To move to an alternative is to undermine the very state law that protects the New Hampshire primary. The incentives just may not be there to move Democrats in the Granite state from that position.

But they and Georgia Democrats -- and the DNCRBC -- now have until June to figure all of that out. 


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The DNCRBC unanimously adopted the Georgia and New Hampshire extensions with all 25 members present on the call in support. That means that these two waiver extensions extend past when initial draft delegate selection plans are due to the DNCRBC for review on May 3. Additionally, the new June 3 deadline for Georgia and New Hampshire to comply is around nine months later in the cycle than when the DNC has in the past finalized the calendar rules/waivers. That is not exactly time lost for the 55 other states and territories to prepare and finalize their plans (with DNCRBC approval), but it does leave some important particulars about the Georgia and New Hampshire primaries -- their dates -- unresolved. That affects state-level preparation for those contests but also impacts the candidates. 

Now that means little if President Biden opts to seek reelection and runs largely unopposed. But this process could bleed over into the Republican nomination race. It will not affect Republicans in New Hampshire. The secretary of state will schedule the presidential primary for some time seven or more days before any other contest that is not Iowa. Likely sometime in January 2024. Yet, if Georgia can be slipped into the end of the pre-window (and that takes a while to play out on the Democratic side) that could affect Republican candidates' preparation for a pre-Super Tuesday primary in the Peach state if not a soon-to-follow Super Tuesday. Granted, that is likely to factor into Republican decision makers' thinking on helping Democrats out with this plan.  

The bottom line is that the DNCRBC took a rather unprecedented step -- leaving this unresolved until the late spring of the year prior to the presidential election -- but that underscores how serious the panel is about finalizing the president's calendar plan as close to its initially presented form as possible. 

Delaware as a Pre-Window Calendar Stand-in on Standby? On Threats, Substitutes and Calendar Shake-Ups

It was reported in the time after January 5 that Delaware was being used as a cudgel to help the DNC/White House nudge New Hampshire Democrats closer to compliance with the president's primary calendar plan adopted by the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee (DNCRBC) in December. As Jake Luhut wrote at The Daily Beast then: 
"The proposal? Not only should South Carolina go first, but if New Hampshire won’t acquiesce to the Democratic National Committee’s demands, Biden’s home state of Delaware should also leapfrog New Hampshire as further punishment."
Well, Delaware "leapfrogging" New Hampshire into the pre-window of the Democratic primary calendar would not exactly be "further punishment." January 5, after all, was the deadline that South Carolina, Nevada, New Hampshire, Georgia and Michigan -- the states granted contingent waivers to go early in 2024 at the December 2 DNCRBC meeting -- were given to show progress on state-specific goals toward the calendar changes called for in the adopted proposal. New Hampshire was obviously given a list of requirements that were, to put it mildly, a tall order considering Republicans control the levers of power in the state (and thus the ability to change anything to do with the first-in-the-nation primary). The Delaware threat was less a threat and more a reality. If New Hampshire Democrats cannot meet the requirements for the waiver they were conditionally given in December, then they will not have a waiver at all under DNC rules for 2024. Delaware is not the "further punishment." New Hampshire Democrats not getting a waiver like every other year following the 1980 cycle is. Actually, that is the punishment. "Further punishment" will likely come from the DNCRBC should 1) the DNC adopt some version of the president's calendar proposal at its February winter meeting and 2) New Hampshire Democrats continue to strike a defiant pose on the first-in-the-nation primary thereafter.


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But why Delaware? 

Yes, it is President Biden's home state. And while that may be part of the calculus for those in the White House, it is not the only part or even the main part of the thinking. 

Like New Hampshire, Delaware is small. Retail politics would be just as possible there as they are in the Granite state. 

Both states lag the national average on the Census Bureau's diversity index (61.1%), but Delaware (59.6%) is less than two points shy while New Hampshire (23.6%) falls nearly 40 points short. 

However, unlike New Hampshire, Delaware is no presidential battleground in the general election. There are some tradeoffs on that front in view of campaign advertising/spending. Swapping Boston media market buys to advertise in New Hampshire for Philadelphia buys to target First state primary voters is an interesting exchange. The former has the benefit of priming New Hampshire primary voters with the general election in mind, but the latter would hit voter not only Delaware voters but Pennsylvania voters ahead of a primary in the Keystone state and a fight for more electoral votes (relative to New Hampshire) in the general election there as well. 

Plus, what Delaware lacks in general election competitiveness relative to the Granite state, it makes up for in feasibility of movement. New Hampshire cannot comply with the likely DNC rules and may or may not try to find alternatives in the end. A Democratic-controlled state government in Dover can and likely very happily would bend over backwards to work toward a pre-window presidential primary if granted a waiver by the DNCRBC. 

But FHQ tends to agree with the anonymous Democratic strategist who questioned the optics of an earlier Delaware primary in the Daily Beast piece:
“I don’t know what value that adds. It’s not a demographically diverse state, it’s not a significantly cheaper media market,” the strategist said. 
“I don’t know if the University of Delaware is gonna become the new Saint Anselm, which is probably the best analogy, but I just don’t see the point,” they continued. “There’s nothing to this that makes this more valuable, and the tourism argument for early primary states is overblown. The TV one is the strongest, because it’s the most sustained form of revenue for these states.”
All of that aside, DNCRBC member, Elaine Kamarck, said it better this past summer after the panel had heard the early primary pitch from the Delaware delegation. Basically, a president has nothing to gain and everything to lose in a home state contest that is first in the order. At best (for the incumbent president), no one shows up as with Tom Harkin in Iowa in 1992. In that case, Delaware would be little more than a beauty contest first primary that most candidates would skip. At worst (again, for the incumbent president), other candidates do show up and either win outright or relative to what would be low expectations. In that case, Delaware would win, but the president would not. 

Of course, Kamarck's comments were about Delaware as the first contest to which Senator Chris Coons (D-DE), as a part of the state's delegation before the DNCRBC, countered that Delaware was not vying only for the first spot, but for any one of the available slots in the pre-window. And maybe Kamarck's rules apply in that situation -- a slightly later early Delaware presidential primary -- or maybe they do not. It could also be that President Biden, with or without a pre-window Delaware primary, runs largely unopposed in 2024 and that this whole effort is not to secure his renomination but geared more toward a paradigm shift in how the pre-window part of the calendar is devised every four years. 


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And that is kind of the thing. Viewed through the lens of a White House seeking renomination in an environment where it is largely unopposed is the sort of confluence of conditions a national party would need in place to make any big change to the beginning of the presidential primary calendar. 

Well, that and said national party would have to be willing to take on Iowa and New Hampshire. The DNCRBC, before the president weighed in, seemed willing to shunt Iowa out of the pre-window. But the president's input added New Hampshire to that mix. Both directly and indirectly.1 Again, the DNCRBC set a difficult set of criteria before New Hampshire Democrats. But they have a chance at an early window waiver (just not one in the position they want or that they could comply with, they would argue). They could give an inch, but have not. Yet. And New Hampshire Democrats may concede nothing. They seem willing at this point to let this play out, take their punishment (if the DNC can enforce it), and try to live to see another cycle in 2028 with a new membership on the DNCRBC.

But all of this -- pushing South Carolina to the first spot, nixing Iowa, trying to bend New Hampshire to the calendar change, substituting Delaware (or Iowa back) into the pre-window, or even adding Georgia and Michigan -- comes with trade-offs. That gets lost in all the post-January 5 chatter about New Hampshire. 

Yes, there is something to be gained by opening up the pre-window to any state that wants to pitch their virtues to the DNCRBC every four years. That gives the national party the flexibility to add and subtract states based on the criteria the DNCRBC has leaned on this cycle. If Nevada, for example, becomes less competitive in general elections, then add Arizona. If Georgia elects more Democrats to statewide office (like secretary of state), then replace South Carolina with the Peach state. If New Hampshire becomes more diverse (in addition to being a battleground), then keep it around or officially add it back. That flexibility is, in the abstract, a good thing for the national party. ...if it can overcome the start-up costs and establish it in the first place.  

However, there is something lost in that transition and it is not just tradition. The continuity of Iowa and New Hampshire every cycle was (and is in the Republican process) arguably a good thing as well for the national parties and for the candidates. There has been certainty there, and with that certainty comes knowledge, or if not knowledge, then an understanding about the rhythms of the nomination system; how it works. And that is true even when the first two states are not well aligned with the overall constituency of a party's primary electorate. 

The path of least resistance for the DNCRBC this cycle would have been to leave well enough alone -- as has almost always been the case for national parties with incumbent presidents seeking reelection -- and just add Michigan to the end of the four state lineup that has existed in the Democratic presidential nomination process since 2008. Iowa and New Hampshire are not perfect fits for the party, but they have the infrastructure in place to dependably go first. Well, maybe not Iowa after 2020. But even after that, there would have been an even greater asterisk placed by Iowa and would continue to place one on New Hampshire. Again, as FHQ has argued elsewhere in this space, the results in those two contests are discounted in the Democratic process. Voters know they are not representative of the broader party. The media knows it and discusses the results in that context and that affects how candidates approach and, afterward, talk about those two contests.

And Raymond Buckley, chair of the New Hampshire Democratic Party, even talked about a version of this in his recent conversation with Politico, saying basically that New Hampshire winnows the field and sets up a state like South Carolina to be decisive. That has not been untrue. And if that is the case, then why mess with a system that, on some level, works?

Mainly, the answer lies in the fact that the current system with the same old calendar was no longer tenable to the president, major parts of the DNCRBC and likely DNC. The DNCRBC did adopt the calendar proposal with just two dissenting votes -- the two members from Iowa and New Hampshire. And the reactions from folks of color on the panel, from members to the DNC chair, spoke volumes about the meaning of the proposed change. 

That is why some version of the president's plan will be adopted next month in Philadelphia. It has been a process that has involved trade-offs with the same old calendar and will likely have some more as the DNCRBC and the rest of the party seeks to fill out the rest of the pre-window lineup should there be vacancies created by a rogue New Hampshire. Perhaps that will be Delaware. ...or perhaps not. Maybe Georgia cannot get there. Maybe it can. Things remain in flux as the party heads into its winter meeting.


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1 The president's proposal directly hit New Hampshire by not placing the presidential primary in the Granite in the first position on the calendar. But it indirectly knocked the state by erecting a significant set of barriers for New Hampshire Democrats to successfully win a pre-window waiver.